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Respondents R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Philip Morris USA, Inc., and Lorillard 
Tobacco Company--collectively, the Original Participating Manufacturers ("OPMs") under the 
Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA")--respectfully submit the following brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Contrary to the State of Idaho's opening assertion, this appeal is not "about arbitrators' 
powers." App. Br. at 1. Rather, this appeal is about the power of courts. The District Court 
correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Idaho's challenge to the arbitrators' 
jurisdiction, because Idaho has demonstrated no cognizable injury from the arbitrators' exercise 
of jurisdiction and thus lacks standing to sue. 
As the District Court summarized, Idaho filed a motion seeking to vacate in part an 
arbitration award that implements a comprehensive settlement between 22 other States 
("Signatory States") and dozens of Participating Manufacturers ("PMs") with respect to 
longstanding disputes concerning the NPM Adjustment under the MSA. See Vacatur Order at 1-
2; R., pp. 485-86. More specifically, Idaho asserted that the arbitration Panel for the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment dispute lacked jurisdiction to enter the provisions of the Settlement Award that 
addressed post-2003 NPM Adjustments: i.e., the provisions that implemented the settlement's 
terms governing the amount and mechanism of certain monetary payments for post-2003 NPM 
Adjustments as among the Settling Parties. See id. 
The District Court held that Idaho lacks standing to raise a jurisdictional objection to the 
Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions. See Vacatur Order at 4-7; R., pp. 488-91. The court 
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concluded-as had the arbitration Panel of three former federal judges-that the challenged 
provisions concerning the Settling Parties' post-2003 payments under the settlement do not 
impose any cognizable injury on Idaho's recovery of its potential share of post-2003 payments 
under the MSA. See id Of particular importance here, it was undisputed that, although the 
Settlement Award released to the Signatory States their potential share of post-2003 NPM 
Adjustment funds that were held in an escrow account for disputed payments, Idaho has no right 
under the MSA to the Signatory States' released funds, and Idaho's own potential share of post-
2003 NPM Adjustment funds remained safely in the escrow account pending the final resolution 
of the State's dispute with the PMs over those funds under the MSA. See id. 
Notably, Idaho on appeal implicitly concedes that most of the Settlement Award's post-
2003 provisions do not harm the State, and thus it drastically narrows the scope of its requested 
relief. Instead of challenging the Panel's jurisdiction to enter all of the Settlement Award's post-
2003 provisions, the State now makes only one narrow assertion-namely, that the Panel should 
not have rejected its objection that the MSA prohibits "selective releases" from the escrow 
account and thus prohibits granting the Signatory States an early release of their potential share 
of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds unless Idaho's potential share of post-2003 NPM 
Adjustment funds was also released early. See App. Br. at 1, 17. Simply put, the State claims 
that it was "harmed" because the Panel refused to provide it with the benefits of a settlement that 
it refused to join. But, as the District Court ruled, that counter-intuitive assertion fails to state a 
cognizable injury; the MSA does not even arguably provide Idaho with any right to the favorable 
treatment that the Signatory States received as consideration under the settlement, because it 
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unquestionably does allow "selective releases" from the escrow account when only some parties 
settle. See Vacatur Order at 6-7; R., pp. 490-91. Indeed, the Panel's interpretation of the MSA 
in this regard applied equally to the selective release of 2003 NPM Adjustment funds, see 
Settlement Award at 12-13; R., pp. 1502-03, which Idaho has not even challenged here (and 
could not possibly challenge under the governing standard ofreview), see App. Br. at 17, 34. 
The District Court was thus correct that Idaho lacks standing to challenge the Settlement 
Award's post-2003 provisions. In any event, the Panel had jurisdiction to enter those provisions, 
as doing so was necessary to resolve the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute among the Settling 
Parties. This Court should affirm the denial of the State's vacatur motion. 
B. Course of the Proceedings & Statement of the Facts 
As the State did, the OPMs have combined the Course of the Proceedings and the 
Statement of the Facts because they are the same, given that the relevant facts arise from the 
proceedings before the District Court and the arbitration Panel. 
1. The NPM Adjustment Under the MSA 
In the MSA, numerous cigarette manufacturers and 52 States and local governments 
settled litigation concerning cigarette marketing and sales. See Arbitration Order at 1-2; R., pp. 
1863-64. Under the MSA, the PMs make annual payments that are apportioned among the MSA 
States pursuant to each State's contractually specified Allocable Share. See id.; see also MSA 
§§ IX(c), IXG); R., pp. 1590-91, 1614-17. 
The NPM Adjustment is a potential reduction in the PMs' annual MSA payments. See 
MSA § IX(d); R., pp. 1592-1610. It is designed to address the PMs' "concerns ... in entering 
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into the MSA ... that other manufacturers would choose not to participate ["NPMs"], thereby 
gaining a competitive advantage by avoiding" the restrictions placed upon the PMs. See 
Arbitration Order at 2; R., p. 1864. For a given year, the Adjustment is available if the 
disadvantages of the MSA were a "significant factor" contributing to the PMs' collective loss of 
market share to the NPMs. See id; see also MSA § IX(d)(l); R., pp. 1592-97. If those 
conditions are satisfied, a State may avoid its share of the Adjustment under the MSA only if it 
enacted and "diligently enforce[ d]" against the NPMs a "Qualifying Statute," which generally 
"requir[ es] all NPMs selling cigarettes in the state to place a certain amount of money for every 
cigarette sold annually into an escrow account." See Arbitration Order at 2; R., p. 1864. A State 
that diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute for the year at issue is not subject to that year's 
Adjustment, and its share of the Adjustment is "reallocated among all [the non-diligent States] 
pro rata in proportion to their respective Allocable Shares" under the MSA, subject to the limit 
that the non-diligent States can lose no more than their full share of the annual payment. See 
MSA § IX(d)(2)(B)-(E); R., pp. 1597-1600. 
2. The Disputed Payments Account Under the MSA 
An Independent Auditor administers payments under the MSA. See MSA §§ XI(a), 
XI(b); R., pp. 1620-22. If a dispute over the Auditor's payment calculations arises, the MSA 
provides that the PMs may pay the disputed funds into escrow in a "Disputed Payments 
Account" ("DPA"). See MSA § XI(d)(8); R., pp. 1627-28. The DPA is under the control of an 
Escrow Agent that is guided by the directives of the Auditor. See MSA §§ XI(t)(2), XI(i); R., 
pp. 1629, 1638-44. Once a dispute over funds in the DPA is "resolved with finality," the funds 
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are disbursed to the "appropriate payee" in accordance with the MSA. See id. Many of the PMs 
have paid disputed NPM Adjustment funds into the DPA. See App. Br. at 7. 
Given that Idaho's appeal now focuses on the Settlement Award's provisions governing 
releases from the DP A, it is important to emphasize at the outset two undisputed points about 
how the DPA operates under the MSA-points that Idaho's brief ignores even though they were 
critical to the Panel's holding in the Settlement Award. 
First, Idaho does not dispute that, under the MSA, the maximum amount of the NPM 
Adjustment funds in the DPA that any individual State is potentially entitled to recover is its own 
allocable share. In no circumstance is a State ever entitled to recover any portion of another 
State's share; instead, the only parties that may recover a particular State's share are that State or 
the PMs. See Br. of Maj. States [including Idaho) in Opp. to Award at 23-26; R., pp. 1928-31. 
Second, Idaho also does not dispute that, as between a particular State and the PMs, 
"under the MSA, the PMs have the right of first recovery." See Settlement Award at 12; R., p. 
1502; see also Br. of Maj. States [including Idaho] in Opp. to Award at 23-26; R., pp. 1928-31. 
In other words, an individual State is not entitled to receive its share of the NPM Adjustment 
funds in the DP A immediately if and when it is found diligent. That is because, as discussed 
above, the MSA's reallocation provisions allow the PMs to shift the diligent States' shares of the 
NPM Adjustment to the non-diligent States in whole or in part. Supra at 4. As a result, even if a 
State is determined to have been diligent, whether it may recover its funds from the DP A is not 
"resolved with finality" until after the PMs' overall entitlement to the NPM Adjustment has been 
resolved based on diligence determinations for the other States. (A diligent State that cannot 
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initially recover its full share of the NPM Adjustment from the DP A for this reason will still 
receive all its money through reallocation from the non-diligent States' next MSA payment.) 
3. The 2003 NPM Adjustment Dispute 
The NPM Adjustments for 1999 through 2002 were resolved by settlement as to all the 
States, but the NPM Adjustment for 2003 (and onward) was not. As a consequence, the 
Independent Auditor urged that the 2003 NPM Adjustment "dispute ... be submitted to binding 
arbitration in accordance with subsection XI(c) of the MSA." Auditor Notice 0140 at 2; R., p. 
1943. MSA § XI(c) requires that the parties submit to a "binding arbitration," "governed by the 
United States Federal Arbitration Act," of "[a]ny dispute ... arising out of or relating to ... any 
determinations made by[] the Independent Auditor (including, without limitation, any dispute 
concerning ... any of the adjustments ... described in subsection IXG) ... )," one of which is the 
NPM Adjustment. See R., p. 1622. 
But the States refused to submit the dispute to arbitration. Idaho instead filed an action in 
the District Court in 2006 seeking a declaratory order that it had diligently enforced for 2003. 
See Arbitration Order at 1; R., p. 1863. The District Court, though, granted the PMs' motion to 
compel arbitration, holding that "the NPM Adjustment, its functioning, allocation, and 
application are all matters falling directly within the purview of-and specifically included 
within-the NPM mandatory arbitration mechanism." See Arbitration Order at 7-8; R., pp. 
1869-70. The District Court further observed that Idaho courts must construe the scope of 
arbitration clauses broadly, by "order[ing] arbitration unless it may be said with positive 
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted 
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dispute." See Arbitration Order at 10 (quoting Int 'I Ass 'n of Firefighters, Local No. 672 v. City 
o_f Boise City, 30 P.3d 940,946 (Idaho 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted); R., p. 1872. 
Ultimately, the courts of every MSA State but Montana ordered arbitration of the 2003 
NPM Adjustment dispute. See, e.g., McGraw v. Am. Tobacco Co., 681 S.E.2d 96, 108-12 (W. 
Va. 2009) (collecting cases). The parties selected an arbitration panel of three former federal 
judges to resolve the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute. The States picked the Hon. Abner J. 
Mikva (D.C. Cir.), the PMs picked the Hon. William G. Bassler (D.N.J.), and those two picked 
the Hon. Fem M. Smith (N.D. Cal.). 
4. The Partial Settlement 
Midway through the arbitration, the PMs and 19 States agreed to a settlement, which is 
memorialized in a binding Term Sheet. See R. 1491, 1508-27. All other States were invited to 
join that settlement, and 3 more States did so before the arbitration concluded. Those 22 
"Signatory States" have an aggregate allocable share under the MSA of about 46%. 1 
The settlement is a comprehensive one that not only resolves the 2003 NPM Adjustment 
dispute among the Settling Parties, but also resolves or streamlines NPM Adjustment disputes 
among them for subsequent years. Because of the massive delays engendered by the States' 
relentless efforts to resist arbitration, the parties are only now concluding resolution of the 2003 
Adjustment dispute, and the disputes over the 2004-2012 Adjustments remain backed up in the 
arbitration queue, with disputes over post-2012 Adjustments sure to follow. It was important to 
1 After the arbitration concluded, two more States separately settled with the PMs on similar 
terms, bringing the aggregate allocable share of States that have settled to nearly 50%. 
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the Settling Parties to simplify the future resolution of these disputes as among themselves 
without affecting the Non-Signatory States. 
As for the 2003-2012 NPM Adjustments, the PMs and the Signatory States resolved their 
disputes completely. The PMs agreed to release to the Signatory States their allocable share of 
the funds that were (or will be) placed in the DPA for these Adjustments, and the Signatory 
States agreed to give the PMs specified credits against their future MSA payments for part of 
these Adjustments. Term Sheet § I & App. A; R., pp. 1509, 1519-22. As the Panel found, "the 
[DPA] funds to be released ... are integral provisions to the Settling Parties' settlement of the 
2003 NPM Adjustment dispute." Settlement Award at 3; R., p. 1493. The DPA has grown 
significantly due to the delayed resolution of the 2004-2012 NPM Adjustments, and none of the 
Settling Parties were interested in continuing to leave those funds inaccessible after their disputes 
had been resolved. (The PMs and the Signatory States also completely resolved potential future 
disputes concerning the 2013-2014 NPM Adjustments, albeit on slightly different financial 
terms. Term Sheet§ II; R., pp. 1509-10.) 
As for the post-2014 NPM Adjustments, the PMs and the Signatory States streamlined 
their potential future disputes. As among themselves, the Settling Parties agreed that certain 
NPM cigarettes fall within the substantive scope of the Signatory States' diligent-enforcement 
obligation, that the PMs will reimburse the Signatory States with a portion of an NPM 
Adjustment allocated to any Signatory States that are found non-diligent, and that the Signatory 
States will pay an additional automatic adjustment amount based on their non-collection of 
escrow. Term Sheet§§ III.B.l, III.C.1-3; R., pp. 1510-14. 
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Of course, the settlement's terms do not apply to the "Non-Signatory States" like Idaho 
who declined to join the settlement. The settlement expressly provides that the Non-Signatory 
States' allocable share of the DPA funds will remain there intact, and that none of the credits to 
the PMs will be applied against the PMs' future payments to the Non-Signatory States. Term 
Sheet App. A 11 4-6; R., pp. 1521-22. Similarly, the settlement confirms that its provisions 
streamlining any post-2014 NPM Adjustment disputes will not apply to the Non-Signatory 
States, whose own liability remains governed by the MSA's diligent-enforcement and 
reallocation provisions. Term Sheet § IV.J; R., p. 1516. Thus, contrary to Idaho's suggestion 
(see App. Br. at 12), the Settlement Award's instructions to the Auditor that the Non-Signatory 
States' potential share of the DP A funds should remain in the DPA was not intended to displace 
Idaho's rights under the MSA, but rather to protect them-by ensuring that the Term Sheet's 
release of the Signatory States' potential share of the DPA funds would not impair the Non-
Signatory States' ability to recover their potential share of the DPA funds under the MSA. See 
Settlement Award at 6, 13; R., pp. 1496, 1503. 
5. The Settlement Award 
Twenty-seven of the Non-Signatory States, including Idaho, objected to the settlement 
and to any award that would direct the Auditor to comply with the settlement's terms. As 
relevant here, the Non-Signatory States objected that: (1) the Panel would lack jurisdiction to 
enter such an award, especially insofar as it addressed post-2003 NPM Adjustments; and (2) the 
settlement's DPA releases and other terms were contrary to the MSA's provisions and thus 
constituted impermissible amendments to the MSA without their consent. See, e.g., Br. of Maj. 
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States [including Idaho] in Opp. to Award at 4-7, 22-35; R., pp. 1909-1912, 1927-1940; Idaho 
Letter at 1-2; R., pp. 518-19. 
After briefing and four days of hearings, the Panel rejected these objections and entered a 
Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award. See R., pp. 1491-1506. The Settlement Award 
thoroughly explained why the objections raised were baseless. 
First, the Panel held that it had jurisdiction to implement the settlement under the 
arbitration provision in MSA § XI(c) and governing law. Settlement Award at 2-5; R., pp. 1492-
95. The Panel concluded that its undisputed jurisdiction over all issues "related to" the 2003 
NPM Adjustment dispute encompassed "the authority to decide all matters necessary to dispose 
of the [dispute]," including the "authority to determine the existence or effect of a settlement of 
the dispute." Settlement Award at 2-3 (citing cases); R., pp. 1492-93. And that determination 
required "rul[ing] on the objections" to the settlement. Settlement Award at 2; R., p. 1492. 
With respect to the settlement's post-2003 terms in particular, the Panel emphasized that 
those terms were "integral provisions" that needed to be implemented in order for the settlement 
to go forward. Settlement Award at 3-4; R., pp. 1493-94. And the Panel explained that it had 
the power to instruct the Auditor to follow them under the well-established law that "[t]ribunals 
have jurisdiction" to give effect to "settlements that cover more than. the claim [being] 
litigat[ ed]," "even where they would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the additional claims being 
resolved." Settlement Award at 4 (citing cases); R., p. 1494. In so reasoning, the Panel made 
clear that it was "just giving effect to the Settling Parties' agreed settlement payments as among 
themselves," rather than "assessing the merits of any NPM Adjustment dispute, including 
BRIEF FOR OPM RESPONDENTS - 10 
particularly questions of diligence or non-diligence for any years other than 2003." Settlement 
Award at 4-5; R., pp. 1494-95. 
Second, the Panel held that the release of the Signatory States' potential share of the DPA 
funds for the 2003-2014 NPM Adjustments was proper under the DPA provisions in MSA 
§ XI(t)(2) and § XI(i), because the settlement "resolve[ d] with finality" the "dispute" over those 
funds given that "the PMs have waived th[eir] right [to those funds] for the Signatory States." 
Settlement Award at 5, 12; R., pp. 1495, 1502. The Panel emphasized that "[t]he PMs' limited 
DPA waiver for the Signatory States in no way prejudices the Non-Signatory States, legally or 
otherwise." Settlement Award at 13; R., p. 1503. To the contrary, the Award expressly protects 
the rights of the Non-Signatory States, by providing that their potential share of the DPA funds 
under the MSA shall "remain[] in the DP A," and that they will be entitled when the dispute over 
those funds is finally resolved to recover the same amount they "would have recovered" under 
the MSA absent the release to the Signatory States. Settlement Award at 6, 13; R., pp. 1496, 
1503. Conversely, though, while the settlement cannot and does not harm the Non-Signatory 
States' rights under the MSA, nor does the MSA give the Non-Signatory States any right to the 
benefits of the settlement that they declined to join: "[t]he Non-Signatory States have no 
entitlement to the favorable treatment that the PMs have afforded the Signatory States as part of 
the consideration for settling their dispute." Settlement Award at 13; R., p. 1503. 
More generally, the Panel held that none of the other objected-to terms of the settlement 
"constitutes an amendment to the MSA that requires the consent of any Non-Signatory States 
under MSA § XVIII(j)." See Settlement Award at 14-15; R., pp. 1504-05. The Panel concluded 
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that "the Term Sheet is not an 'amendment' of the MSA at all," but rather "a settlement of 
disputes that have arisen under the MSA as written." Id. And regardless, the Panel further 
observed that consent for any amendment to the MSA is required only from parties who are 
"affected," which "the Panel construe[d] ... to mean 'materially prejudiced by."' Settlement 
Award at 15; R., p. 1505. The Panel concluded that the Non-Signatory States could not satisfy 
that standard, because they are not "bound by any terms in the [settlement]." Id. 2 
6. Idaho's Motion to Vacate in Part the Settlement Award 
Idaho requested the District Court to vacate the Settlement Award's provisions that "dealt 
with monies for years after 2003," "on the ground these sections go beyond the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment Arbitration Panel's power." Vacatur Motion at 1; R., p. 189; accordVacatur Memo. 
at 17-19; R., 392-94. Notably, consistent with the State's claim that the Panel lackedjurisdiction 
to address post-2003 issues, Idaho sought vacatur of all of the Settlement Award's post-2003 
provisions and none of the Settlement Award's 2003 provisions. 
On the one hand, Idaho requested vacatur of post-2003 provisions that had nothing to do 
with the DPA, let alone with the State's potential share of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in 
the DPA: e.g., the credits from the Signatory States' annual payments that the PMs receive for 
the 2004-2014 NPM Adjustments; the automatic adjustment amounts that the Signatory States 
2 The Settlement Award also contains a provision governing how the 2003 NPM Adjustment will 
be allocated, in light of the Signatory States' settlement, among the remaining Non-Signatory 
States who are subject to the Adjustment. See Settlement Award at 3, 9-11, 13-14; R., pp. 1493, 
1499-1501, 1503-04. That provision, however, does not affect Idaho, because the PMs 
ultimately decided after conducting discovery not to contest Idaho's diligence for 2003, and thus 
Idaho is not subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment at all. See App. Br. at 8. 
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provide to the PMs for the post-2014 NPM Adjustments; and the reimbursements that the PMs 
provide to the Signatory States for the post-2014 NPM Adjustments. See Vacatur Motion at 1 
(requesting vacatur of, among other things, Settlement Award §§ II.2 to the extent it incorporated 
Term Sheet ,r,r I (for years after 2003), III.B.1, III.C.1); R., p. 373. On the other hand, and of 
particular relevance here, Idaho did not seek vacatur of the Settlement Award's determination 
that selectively releasing the Signatory States' potential share of the 2003 NPM Adjustment 
funds in the DPA was neither contrary to the MSA nor prejudicial to the Non-Signatory States. 
See id. (requesting vacatur of Settlement Award §§ III, V.4 only as applied to "years after 
2003"). 
7. The District Court's Order Denying Vacatur 
The District Court held that "Idaho has no standing" to challenge the Settlement Award's 
post-2003 provisions. Vacatur Order at 7; R., p. 491. The court first concluded that Idaho "must 
show a 'distinct palpable injury"' even when raising a jurisdictional objection to an arbitration 
award. Vacatur Order at 5; R., p. 489. And the court then expressly agreed with the Panel that 
Idaho will not suffer "any legal prejudice or adverse effect . . . as a result" of the Settlement 
A ward's post-2003 provisions. Vacatur Order at 6; R., p. 490. Of most relevance now, the court 
explained that "[t]he 'selective release of post-2003 funds' from the DPA is not a cognizable 
injury," because "Idaho's share of the disputed funds remains in the DP A," "its right to future 
shares is unaffected," and it "does not have a right to the favorable treatment received by the 
[Signatory] States in consideration for their entering the Term Sheet." Vacatur Order at 6-7; R., 
pp. 490-91. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Issue 1. Whether Idaho lacks standing to seek to vacate the Settlement Award's post-
2003 provisions on jurisdictional grounds, given that the State's sole asserted injury-i.e., the 
Panel's ruling upholding the selective release of post-2003 funds from the DPA-(a) is unrelated 
to most of the Settlement A ward's post-2003 provisions, and (b) is not a cognizable injury under 
the MSA's DPA provisions, as confirmed by the Panel's unchallenged and unchallengeable 
ruling upholding the selective release of 2003 funds from the DP A. 
Issue 2. Whether the Panel had jurisdiction to enter the Settlement Award's post-2003 
provisions, given that doing so was necessary to implement the Settling Parties' resolution of the 
2003 NPM Adjustment dispute among themselves, especially in light of objections to the 
lawfulness of the settlement that were raised by Idaho and other Non-Signatory States? 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho lacks standing to seek vacatur of any of the Settlement Award's post-2003 
provisions. And in any event, the Panel had jurisdiction to enter all of those provisions. This 
Court should therefore affirm the District Court's judgment denying the State's vacatur motion. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT IDAHO HAS NO 
STANDING TO SEEK VACATUR OF THE SETTLEMENT AWARD'S POST-
2003 PROVISIONS 
The District Court held that Idaho must demonstrate a cognizable injury in order to 
establish its standing to challenge the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions, and the court 
further held that Idaho had failed to show any such injury. On appeal, the State essentially 
concedes the first holding, and its attack on the second holding is both limited and meritless. 
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A. The State Must Demonstrate Cognizable Injury From The Settlement 
Award's Post-2003 Provisions In Order To Have Standing To Challenge The 
Panel's Jurisdiction To Enter Those Provisions 
"It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a 
court's jurisdiction must have standing." Young v. City of Ketchum, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (Idaho 
2002). The core element of standing is that the plaintiff must prove "an injury in fact," which 
"requires a showing of a 'distinct palpable injury'" caused by the challenged conduct. Id.; see 
also Noh v. Cenarrusa, 53 P.3d 1217, 1219 (Idaho 2002) (holding that the requisite injury cannot 
be "speculative"). Although the State is "entitled to special solicitude in the standing analysis," 
it too must at least identify a "complained-of harm," not just an abstract violation of law. See 
Wasden v. State Bd. of Land Commr's, 280 P.3d 693,697 (Idaho 2012). 
Accordingly, as the Panel recognized, the "general rule ... is that a non-settling party 
does not have standing to object to a settlement between other parties." See Settlement Award at 
12 (citing, among other cases, Jamie S. v. 1\1ilwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 501 (7th Cir. 
2012), and In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2001)); R., p. 1502. 
Instead, a non-settling party has standing to object only if the settlement creates "plain legal 
prejudice" to its own rights. See id. This Court applied these principles in State v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 879 P .2d 1111 (Idaho 1994 ). There, after a university settled an insurance 
coverage dispute with one of its two insurers, the second insurer tried to challenge the adequacy 
of the settlement. See id. at 1113-14. This Court held that the non-settling insurer "ha[ d] no 
standing to challenge the sufficiency of [the settling insurer's] payment," because "the adequacy 
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of (that payment] ha(d] no effect on [the non-settling insurer's] rights or liabilities" under its 
insurance contract and the governing law. See id. at 1119. 
Notably, Idaho concedes on appeal that it must (at least) allege an "injury in fact" from 
the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions in order to have standing to raise its jurisdictional 
objection to those provisions. See App. Br. at 18. The State thus has abandoned its unsuccessful 
argument below that injury is unnecessary to establish standing where the particular claim 
presented happens to be ajurisdictional objection to an arbitration award. See Vacatur Order at 
4-5; R., pp. 488-89. The State declines to re-raise that argument here for good reason: 
"[s]tanding is a preliminary question" that "focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the 
issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Young, 44 P.3d at 1159 (emphasis added). 
Given the State's concession, it is entirely irrelevant whether, under the Federal 
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § I et seq., jurisdictional defects in an arbitration award are 
treated for purposes of judicial review as "trial" errors that require a further showing of 
"prejudice" or as "structural" errors that do not so require. See App. Br. at 25-27 (discussing this 
issue). The trial/structural dichotomy pertains to whether the alleged error in an arbitration 
award sufficiently undermines the award that it warrants vacating the award on the merits under 
the FAA. For either type of error, however, the challenged award itself must be sufficiently 
injurious to the plaintiff that the plaintiff has standing to seek vacatur under the FAA in the first 
place. Yet here, as demonstrated below, the fundamental flaw in Idaho's vacatur motion and 
appeal is that the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions do not injure the State at all. 
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B. The State Fails To Demonstrate Cognizable Injury From The Settlement 
Award's Post-2003 Provisions 
As a preliminary matter, it warrants emphasis that the State's appellate brief expressly 
abandons almost all of the relief that it originally sought in its vacatur motion. Idaho now 
disclaims its request to vacate the Settlement Award's myriad post-2003 provisions that have 
nothing to do with the DPA, and even disclaims its request to vacate the Settlement Award's 
provisions that released the Signatory States' potential share of the post-2003 NPM Adjustment 
funds in the DPA. Compare App. Br. at 17, 34, with Vacatur Motion at 1; R., p. 189. Idaho 
evidently takes this extraordinary action because it cannot dispute the conclusion of the District 
Court and the Panel that the State suffers no cognizable injury from those post-2003 provisions 
that implement the settlement's terms governing the amount and mechanism of post-2003 
payments among the Settling Parties. See Vacatur Order at 5-7; R., pp. 489-91; Settlement 
Award at 12-14; R., pp. 1502-04. Of particular relevance here, the State implicitly concedes that 
it has no right under the MSA to the Signatory States' potential share of the post-2003 funds 
released from the DPA, that its own potential share of the post-2003 funds remains protected in 
the DP A, and that it will ultimately recover the same amount of those funds, once the dispute 
over them is finally resolved with the PMs, as it would have recovered under the MSA absent the 
release of the Signatory States' potential share. See Vacatur Order at 7; R., p. 491; Settlement 
Award at 13; R., p. 1503; see also supra at 5-6, 11. 
Accordingly, the State on appeal limits its vacatur request to any post-2003 provisions in 
the Settlement Award that "prohibit Idaho from sharing in [the early] release of post-2003 NPM 
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Adjustment funds" by "deny[ing] release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho." See 
App. Br. at 17, 34. But, as the District Court correctly held and as further shown below, "[t]he 
'selective release of post-2003 funds' from the DPA is not a cognizable injury," because the 
MSA does not provide Idaho with "a right to the favorable treatment received by the [Signatory] 
States in consideration for their entering the Term Sheet." Vacatur Order at 6-7; R., pp. 490-91. 
1. The Panel thoroughly explained that selectively releasing DP A funds was 
permissible "under the MSA" because the Signatory States and the Non-Signatory States were 
differently situated with respect to "finality" in light of the settlement. See Settlement A ward at 
12-13; R., pp. 1502-03. More specifically, the Panel held that, for purposes of the DPA 
provisions in MSA § XI(f)(2) and § XI(i), the settlement had "resolve[d] with finality" the 
dispute concerning the Signatory States' potential share of the 2003 NPM Adjustment funds in 
the DPA, because "the PMs have waived th[eir] right [to those funds] for the Signatory States." 
See Settlement Award at 5, 12; R., pp. 1495, 1502. That waiver was sufficient to "allow[] the 
Signatory States to recover their Allocable Share of th[ e] DP A funds," the Panel reasoned, 
because the Signatory States were the only parties with a claim to those funds once the PMs 
waived their "right of first recovery." See Settlement Award at 12; R., p. 1502; see also supra at 
5-6. In fundamental contrast, the "dispute" over the Non-Signatory States' potential share of the 
2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA was not "resolved with finality," because the PMs had 
not waived their right of first recovery against those funds and "[t]he Non-Signatory States have 
no entitlement to the favorable treatment that the PMs have afforded the Signatory States as part 
of the consideration for settling their dispute." See Settlement Award at 13; R., p. 1503. 
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Thus, contrary to the State's assertion that the Panel "displaced the MSA" with the Term 
Sheet when it upheld the selectivity of the post-settlement DPA releases (see App. Br. at 27-31), 
the Panel in actuality interpreted the MSA's DPA provisions to allow selectively releasing DPA 
funds in light of the partial settlement. And tellingly, Idaho's brief does not address, let alone 
refute, the Panel's interpretation that the partial settlement's limited waiver of the PMs' right of 
first recovery from the DP A created "finality" for the Signatory States but not for the Non-
Signatory States. See id. at 31-33 (ignoring that interpretation of the "resolved with finality" 
language in the MSA's DPA provisions, and citing instead various other MSA provisions that 
have nothing to do with determining when a dispute over DPA funds has been "resolved with 
finality"). Moreover, the only two MSA courts to have considered the Panel's interpretation of 
the MSA's DPA provisions have agreed with that interpretation: (1) the District Court below, 
see Vacatur Order at 6-7; R., pp. 490-91; and (2) the Colorado MSA court, when denying that 
State's request for a preliminary injunction against the selective DPA releases, see State ex rel. 
Suthers v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 1997CV3432, Hr' g Tr. at 118, 123 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
Apr. 11, 2013) ("essentially agree[ing]" that "a settlement" can be "a final determination under 
[the] MSA['s DPA provisions]" and that "there's nothing explicit, necessarily, in the MSA" that 
compels the States to "remain unified" when settling disputes concerning NPM Adjustment 
funds in the DPA); R., pp. 1837-38.3 
3 The decisions by the MSA courts in Pennsylvania and Missouri that Idaho cites (see App. Br. at 
29-30) are inapposite. Those decisions (which are being appealed) did not vacate the Settlement 
Award's DPA provisions, but rather a different and unrelated provision-namely, the provision 
BRIEF FOR OPM RESPONDENTS - 19 
2. Idaho's lack of cognizable injury from the Panel's ruling upholding the selectivity 
of the post-2003 DPA releases is especially clear because the very same ruling also upheld the 
selectivity of the 2003 DPA releases, and that application of the ruling is unchallenged by Idaho 
and unchallengeable under the FAA. 
There is no dispute that the Settlement Award's provisions upholding the selectivity of 
the DPA releases encompassed 2003 NPM Adjustment funds. See App. Br. at 9, 12. The 
Settlement Award does not even contain provisions separately upholding the selectivity of DP A 
releases for post-2003 and for 2003: there is a single set of DP A provisions that applies to both. 
See Settlement Award §§ III.1-3, V.4 DPA; R., pp. 1496-97, 1502-03. Indeed, Idaho itself 
specifically insisted that the Panel must determine whether the MSA allowed selectively 
releasing DPA funds for 2003, by "object[ing] to any premature release from the DPA, even if 
structured to apply only to the 2003 NPM Adjustment." Idaho Letter at 2 (emphasis added); R., 
p. 519; accord Br. of Maj. States [including Idaho] in Opp. to Award at 4-5; R., pp. 1909-10. 
Yet there also is no dispute that Idaho has not requested vacatur of the Panel's 
determination that the MSA permitted selectively releasing the 2003 NPM Adjustments funds 
from the DPA. See App. Br. at 13, 34. Moreover, any such request would have been futile. The 
State itself concedes that the Panel had jurisdiction to determine the proper disposition under the 
MSA of the 2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA. See id. at 7-8; see also infra at 22-23 
(continued ... ) 
governing how the 2003 NPM Adjustment should be reallocated among the non-diligent Non-
Signatory States in light of the settlement. See id; see also supra at 12 n.2 ( explaining that this 
provision of the Settlement Award is inapplicable to Idaho). 
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(demonstrating the Panel's jurisdiction to rule on the 2003 DPA funds). And the merits of the 
Panel's interpretation of the MSA's DPA provisions cannot be second-guessed under the FAA's 
extremely narrow standard for judicial review of arbitration awards. See, e.g., Oxford Health 
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2070 (2013) ("So long as the arbitrator was 'arguably 
construing' the contract ... a court may not correct his mistakes .... "). 
3. Finally, contrary to the State's suggestion (see App. Br. at 18-19), the foregoing 
analysis of why the State lacks a cognizable injury does not improperly conflate the legal merits 
of the State's claim with the State's standing to bring that claim. Where a legal issue pertaining 
to the plaintiff's standing is "separate and independent" from the plaintiff's merits claim, courts 
must adjudicate that issue at the outset, because they may not "assum[ e] jurisdiction based upon 
a hypothetical legal injury." See Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 2007); see 
also, e.g., Troutner v. Kempthorne, 128 P.3d 926, 927-30 (Idaho 2006) (rejecting Democratic 
plaintiffs' standing to challenge whether the Governor had appointed more Republicans to the 
Idaho Judicial Council than was statutorily allowed, because the statute did not give Democrats 
any legal right to be appointed even assuming the Republican appointment was invalid). 
Here, Idaho itself effectively concedes that its standing to bring its merits claim-i. e., the 
objection that the post-2003 DPA ruling exceeded the Panel's authority under the arbitration 
provision in MSA § XI(c)-tums on the distinct legal question whether selectively releasing DPA 
funds is prohibited under the DPA provisions in MSA § XI(/)(2) and § Xl(i). In particular, 
Idaho's sole argument for why vacating the post-2003 DPA ruling on jurisdictional grounds will 
"redress [its] claimed injury" is that the State will then be able to "receive post-2003 funds from 
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the DP A because that is what the MSA provides." See App. Br. at 20. But, of course, as the 
District Court and Panel both held, the MSA unquestionably provides no such thing, either for 
2003 or for post-2003. Accordingly, the State's jurisdictional challenge to the post-2003 DPA 
ruling is "based upon a hypothetical legal injury" that cannot support standing, see Day, 500 F.3d 
at 1137-38, and so the District Court's denial of Idaho's vacatur motion should be affirmed. 
II. THE PANEL CORRECTLY HELD THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER 
THE SETTLEMENT AW ARD'S POST-2003 PROVISIONS 
In any event, the District Court's denial of the State's vacatur motion may be affirmed on 
the alternative ground that the Panel properly concluded that it had jurisdiction to enter the 
Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions. Given that "arbitration is a favored remedy," a party 
asserting that a particular dispute falls outside the scope of a valid arbitration clause must 
provide "positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that 
covers the asserted dispute," and any "[ d]oubts are to be 'resolved in favor of coverage.'" City 
of Boise City, 30 P.3d at 946 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc 'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 
643,650 (1986)). The State does not meet that heavy burden. 
The Panel itself thoroughly explained why it had jurisdiction to enter the Settlement 
Award, including the post-2003 provisions, under the MSA's arbitration provision, the District 
Court's Arbitration Order, and settled law. To start, the Panel recognized that "its jurisdiction 
under Section XI( c) of the MSA and the court orders compelling arbitration includes 'all issues 
"related to"' the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute." Settlement Award at 2; R., p. 1492; accord 
Arbitration Order at 8 ("[T]he NPM Adjustment, its functioning, allocation, and application are 
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all matters falling directly within the purview of-and specifically included within-the NPM 
mandatory arbitration mechanism."); R., p. 1870. This jurisdiction, as the Panel next noted, 
encompasses "the authority to decide all matters necessary to dispose of the [dispute]," including 
the "authority to determine the existence or effect of a settlement of the dispute" and "to rule on 
the objections" to the settlement. Settlement Award at 2-3 (citing, among other cases, Ross Bros. 
Constr. Co. v. Int'/ Steel Servs., 283 F.3d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 2002), and United Steel Workers 
Int'/ Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2008)); R., pp. 1492-93. 
The Panel then held that the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions fall within this 
jurisdictional authority. It observed that the post-2003 terms were "integral provisions" that 
needed to be implemented in order for the partial settlement of the 2003 NPM Adjustment to go 
forward. Settlement Award at 3-4; R., pp. 1493-94. And so the Panel invoked the well-
established law that "[t]ribunals have jurisdiction" to give effect to "settlements that cover more 
than the claim [being] litigat[ed]," "even where they would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
additional claims being resolved." Settlement Award at 4 (citing, among other cases, Abramson 
v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968), and Nottingham Partners v. Trans-
Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1991)); R., p. 1494; see also Stolt-Nielsen SA v. 
Anima/Feeds Int'!, 559 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2010) ("[I]t is appropriate to presume that parties that 
enter into an arbitration agreement implicitly authorize the arbitrator to adopt such procedures as 
are necessary to give effect to the parties' agreement."). In so reasoning, the Panel made clear 
that it was "just giving effect to the Settling Parties' agreed settlement payments as among 
themselves," rather than "assessing the merits of any NPM Adjustment dispute, including 
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particularly questions of diligence or non-diligence for any years other than 2003." Settlement 
Award at 4-5; R., pp. 1494-95. 
Once again, Idaho's brief does not address, let alone refute, the Panel's rationale. 
Instead, the State just cites several cases where arbitration awards were vacated because the 
arbitrators inexplicably ruled on issues that had never actually been submitted to arbitration. See 
App. Br. at 23-25. Yet the State's reliance on such cases ignores the obvious distinction that the 
Panel here ruled on post-2003 issues only because doing so was necessary to resolve among the 
Settling Parties the 2003 dispute that had been submitted to arbitration. 
Nor does Idaho have any basis for complaining that one of the post-2003 issues resolved 
by the Panel was that the Non-Signatory States are not entitled under the MSA to the same 
favorable DPA treatment that the PMs have afforded the Signatory States. See id at 22-23. As 
discussed earlier, Idaho expressly objected to the settlement on the ground that the selectivity of 
the 2003 DPA release was invalid under the MSA. Supra at 20. Thus, having itself effectively 
"submitted (the selective DP A release] issue to the arbitrator," Idaho cannot claim that the Panel 
lacked jurisdiction to rule against it on that issue. See Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at 2068 & n.2; 
see also Abramson, 392 F.2d at 762. 
In sum, the PMs have demonstrated that the Panel plainly had jurisdiction to enter all of 
the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions. At a minimum, though, Idaho has not provided 
this Court with "positive assurance" to the contrary. See City of Boise City, 30 P.3d at 946. 
Accordingly, the State has failed to satisfy its heavy burden for seeking vacatur of the Settlement 
Award's post-2003 provisions. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the judgment of the District Court denying the State of Idaho's 
Motion to Vacate in Part the Partial Award of the 2003 NPM Adjustment Arbitration Panel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of June, 2014. 
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